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Thoughtful and attentive Americans have by now become accustomed to reading about skullduggery, crimes, conspiracies, negligence, waste, corruption, bribery, subornation, drug abuse, the inhuman uses of human subjects, and falsified scientific data, as well as
about a variety of acts, decisions, initiatives, formulas and practices in
high places that are, otherwise, either problematic or offensive to
"community standards" of decency and civility. We encounter these
scandals in print and through the electronic media with disturbing
regularity.
Most of these tales-like those about rigged bids in the heavy
electrical equipment industry, uncovered in the 1960's by TVA's thendirector, General Vogel, after he was smarted by criticisms from the
country's industry leaders for purchasing equipment from an English
company-are told by "outsiders": FTC attorneys, wage and hour
investigators, congressional committee staffers, Securities and Exchange enforcement officers, Internal Revenue agents, Justice or
Treasury Department personnel and, most recently, by a new breed
of "investigative reporters."
There is nothing essentially new in this type of report, either in
legal or procedural terms. Journalists and regulatory personnel, after
all, have professional obligations which virtually compel a reasonable
effort to protect the public's interest in law, order, integrity, and
decency, and thus to ferret out information. Nor are reports of the
consequent efforts of parties aggrieved by such persons to intimidate
witnesses and researchers at all novel. In this respect, Ralph Nader's
successful suit against General Motors' harassment tactics is more than
just noteworthy.
Considerably more novel, given the long-established rights of
employers to "fire at will" all but the minority of Americans whose job
claims are buttressed by provisions in collectively bargained agreements and contracts, are public reports by employees of the questionable ways and doubtfully acceptable behavior of their employers in
the mills, shops, labs, forges, and offices in which they work. Thus, a
well informed civilian Pentagon official defrocked the "high priests of
waste" in the Department of Defense quite without the help of "deep
throats" outside that organization.' President Carter's holdover Am' A. FrrzERALD,THE
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bassador to El Salvador did not need a Ramparts reporter to inform
him of the hazards of projected policies toward the governing junta
that have been regularly articulated since the 1980 election by Mr.
Reagan's Secretary of State. Also, a small handful of dissenting CIA
personnel did not require the assistance of The New York Times to
discover and disclose information about a number of highly questionable undertakings, in the U.S. and elsewhere, even referred to by a
former CIA director in private discussions with Times management as
"The Company's family jewels." '2 In each of these instances of "whistleblowing," the publicist-accusers, to whom the majority of citizens
(and more responsible leaders) quite clearly owe large debts, have lost
their jobs or suffered reassignments to lesser positions.
Alert to the manifold issues having to do with the competing and
otherwise complex rights, privileges, claims, immunities, and obligations, variously, of citizens, co-workers, managers, owners, consumers, competitors, and regulators, Alan F. Westin has afforded us
usefully detailed descriptions of the experiences of ten Americans who
"went public" with their misgivings or formal accusations against
employers after having carefully exhausted intra-organizational remedies or mechanisms which might have been productive of changes in
one or another procedure, policy, technique, or work process.
Westin has a fine reputation, going back to his civil rights activities in Florida in the late 1940's(!), for both acting upon and studying
questions pertaining to the claims of individuals to their rights to
privacy, to uses of public accommodations, to the franchise, and to
due process. This reputation is deservedly enhanced by his newest
excursion into terrain occupied by those who see only dangers to the
republic if the endowments in the Bill of Rights cannot be literally
locked out of public and private organizations. In this excursion,
Westin offers us another measure of the depth of his concerns about
individual rights: Westin reverses field by moving from a concern
with preservation of individual privacy to a concern with the legitimacy of the breadth of the protective cover accorded corporateclaims
to privacy. Corporations emerge from Westin's explorations as onesided spokesmen for privacy, favoring their own claims to protection
while deploring those of employees and acting against them to the
point of cruelty.
It needs to be said at the outset that the grievants' stories, in the
book here under review, and the logic of their employers for rejecting
their accusations and for harassing, threatening, abusing, demoting,
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"freezing-out," maligning, and firing them, are presented by the accusors themselves, by their friends, by their advisors, or by the sympathetic editors of the book. The stories of corporate executives and their
attorneys are thus by no means fully reported in the book. Neither are
the sides of union leaders explored who, in two cases, appear to have
compromised their representational roles on behalf of victimized
whistleblowers.
In some cases, moreover, the accusations seem a mite less meritorious now than they did to some of the whistleblowers at the time they
tried to stop the company's actions. Thus, a woman doctor was manhandled, so to speak, for trying to dissuade a pharmaceutical company from using a saccharin solution to package a bitter-tasting concoction useful in the treatment of diarrhea. Dr. Pierce was cognizant
of the fact that, as a physician, she was obliged to attend to professional medical-ethical constraints even though she was also obliged, as
an employee, to march to the beat of commercial drummers. It was
her point that a less potentially hazardous sweetener would be available for the medication in question not more than three months after
the saccharin solution would be in practitioners' hands. As the editor
of Dr. Pierce's sad tale correctly points out, the question of saccharin's
side effects had not yet been settled in 1981. Since the last presidential
election day, the term "benefit/cost analysis" has been elevated to the
position of a national policy watchword; there will inevitably be
readers of Dr. Pierce's story who will think of "tradeoffs" between six
potential years of "foregone opportunities" for a business firm, on one
side, and the potentially unharmed consumers of saccharin-coated
pills on the other. The fact that Dr. Pierce had earlier resigned from
the Food and Drug Administration when her whistle failed, for a
year, to blow an end to the games being played about the side-effects
of contraceptive pills, will lead many of the same readers to speculate
about the balances of sound judgment, professional pique, supercautiousness, and downright crankiness in Dr. Pierce's approach to complex scientific, legal, ethical, and professional questions. Surely, some
readers will be understandably skeptical of one or more of these tales
of employer abuse on the ground that they are one-sided presentations.
Most readers, however, will be struck, very directly and forcefully, by the highly patterned quality of manager responses to employee observations and warnings about the unseemliness, danger, or
legality of a given practice, action, or decision. These responses take
the following form: (1) first, interested and polite attention to employee warnings, then (2) ritual review, followed by (3) benign neglect, by (4) polite admonition, by (5) warnings, by (6) insinuations
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about the whistleblower's mental health, by (7) gratuitous employee
performance reviews, by (8) demotions, "freeze outs," and, in a few
cases, by (9) suspensions and terminations. In one case, not reviewed
in the Westin volume, a whistleblower may have been murdered for
3
her sins!

Managers thus are tempted to respond to what are initially helpful efforts by a concerned employee in accord with a "scenario." It is
simply not possible to believe that Westin's whistleblowers have compared notes and, thereafter, prepared parallel "tattletales" on their
employers. In most of the cases, moreover, there are statements and
observations by one or more corroborating witnesses from among coworkers who confirm a given whistleblower's basic statement. It is sad
to note that in only a few cases do these corroborators actually join
with the principals in living out the consequences of their shared
misgivings about the matters in dispute.
The cases explored involve: (1) a serious design problem in an
Eastern Airlines airplane, specifically the Lockheed L-1011 auto pilot
system, which contributed materially to a steep dive and a crash in
which 103 people died, though two responsible pilots discovered the
problem during simulated flights priorto the system's commerical use;
(2) engineering deficiences in nuclear power systems discovered and
reported by a systems application engineer at the Nuclear Services
Corporation more than five years before the "meltdown" at Three
Mile Island; (3) an apparently blatant case of sex discrimination
against a woman in the Wall Street Journal'sadvertising department;
(4) an almost stereotyped instance of sexual harassment of a private
secretary by her supervisor at the New Jersey Public Service Electric
and Gas Co.; (5) the discovery by an internal auditor who, like the
physician at Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., has ethical obligations under
the accounting profession's code, of billing errors by the Michigan
Consolidated Gas Co. favoring welfare recipients in the amount of
between $2.6 million (in 1974) and $12.3 million (in 1978); (6) a
United Parcel Service truck driver who was obliged to certify as safe
and to drive trucks with oil-soaked brake linings, broken brake drums,
worn tires, broken wheel seals, and malfunctioning headlights; (7) an
engineer of the infamous Ford Pinto gasoline tank; (8) an "in-house
counsel" and the notorious case of the Associated Milk Producers'
illegal campaign contributions; (9) two skilled heavy construction
equipment operators and a manifestly unsafe electric supply wiring
system, at a work site, during construction of the Metro transit system
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in the nation's capital; and (10) Dr. Pierce in the matter of a drug
sweetener at the Ortho Pharmaceutical Co.
Readers will find Professor Westin's introductory and concluding
chapters-the former, a brief historical review of employees' rights
and the latter a discussion of a list of steps which might assure more
Americans, as employees, of something like due process-to be measured and to be respectful of the need for privacy of managers and
their organizations. His treatment of managers' need for authority, as
owners or the owners' representatives in a society ruled by laws, is also
thoughtful; Westin's analysis is not "anti-corporation." Thus, while
those with legal training may disagree with a point here or a nuance
there, Westin affords all his readers abundant room for cavils; but the
margins for dissent are not wide. While many social scientists would
hope for more detailed studies-"a 'for instance' is," notoriously, "not
proof," as every junior highschooler knows-most will recognize that
Westin's unpretentious, cogent, and well-executed essays and the cases
adumbrated by principals or by editorial helpers, point to an extraordinarily significant cluster of issues in a society in which ever-larger
numbers of citizens are employed in large corporations.
Westin, once again, has served the Bill of Rights well. He has
managed to generate respect (not pity, with its undertones of contempt) for his subjects and has served both students of the law and of
the social sciences by joining issues of truly joint interest. He has done
so "without prejudice," as lawyers like to say, to the apparently
obtuse, myopic, socially insensitive, interpersonally cloddish, and
even totalitarian managers who were offended by his subjects' urgings
and cautions.
A few of us in the social sciences are grateful, too, to Westin for
presenting materials bearing, very significantly, on issues that go
beyond those about individual rights; these issues would remain even
if whistleblowers came to enjoy the protective measures Westin advocates in his perceptive closing essay. Consider that the problems attaching to the powers of large organizations would by no means be
adequately confronted by simply extending the rights of a handful of
intra-organizational critics. I would suggest that there is simply no
reason to be confident that legally assured protections of the individual freedoms against corporate abridgements, by the ways and means
urged by Westin, would actually encourage or inspire larger numbers
of intra-organizational observers to report on the sometimes nefarious
ways and means of their managers. We have lately become an increasingly passive, even apathetic, nation of voters, reluctant civil libertarians, and reluctant witnesses to crimes; we have abundant evidence of
the self-censorship practices even of academicians, possessors of well-

720

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:715

developed claims to "academic freedom," during the McCarthy years;
and we are currently threatened, in our schools, libraries and communities by self-styled, know-nothing religious fundamentalists. To
protect individual freedoms is not to assure their practice by free men
and women. This is an issue which goes beyond those joined by
Westin, but which is closely related to Westin's immediate concerns.
Perhaps because I encountered Westin's new work during a summer period in which I read Harrison Salisbury's reconstruction of The
New York Times' efforts to get to the bottom of a series of CIA actions,
and heard news reports about proposed changes in corporate disclosure requirements and in restrictions on CIA activities, I come away
from Whistle-Blowing with far less optimism about corporate power
than is implied by the tone of Westin's proposals for change. Indeed, I
come away from Westin's cases and from other current reading with a
sharp sense of the insistently growing demands of large organizations
and their protagonists for the protection of their ways against disclosure! Corporate preoccupations with secrecy are thus very evidently
heightening in our organizations, public and private, at the very
moment of Westin's lonely cry for more disclosure, or at least for the
possibility of more candor about corporate activities. The heads of the
Federal Trade Commission and the Securities Exchange Commission
have both made strong statements against a number of corporate
disclosure requirements and in favor of the curtailment of their agencies' regulatory concerns with disclosure.4 One might add that these
renewed preoccupations have increased even as the number of law
and business school graduates-the former with training in constitutional law and the latter with exposure to courses in "business ethics"
and "business and society"--have skyrocketed.
Corporate preoccupations with secrecy have also expanded as
business school professors and consultants, in loud choruses, have been
urging corporate clients to "reform" their personnel relations, taking
particular care to stress the need for the widergoing participation of
employees in decisionmaking. Westin, agreeing with the above, sees
this "work reform movement," with its major theme of "worker participation," as an important prong in a multi-pronged attack which he
urges should be mounted against secretive corporate miscreants who
abuse their employees. I must confess that, had I read Westin's respondents' stories about their employers and the other thrusts against
4 See N.Y. Times, July 14, 1981, at D-6 (interview with John S.R. Shad); id., Aug. 3, 1981,
at D-1 (interview with John S.R. Shad); id., Oct. 26, 1981, at D-1 (interview with John S.R.
Shad); id., Oct. 27, 1981, at A-18 (interview with William F. Baxter); Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1981,
at 6 (interview with William F. Baxter).
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disclosure noted in previous paragraphs, I would have been able to
make afar stronger case than I did, in a recent volume of my own, for
the position that work reformers have almost no prospects for the
successful implementation of their programmatic ideas. One readily
infers from Westin's tale-bearers that managers already have far more
"worker participation" than they can tolerate. Westin's respondents
were participants in the best sense of the term by virtue of the tasks
which they were employed to perform, but their employers restrained
their participative modes to collaboration, in the worst sense of the
term. The fact is that neither the nation nor corporations are democratic; we are a republic and corporations are, well, corporations.
One may also note in passing that the CIA's employees refer to
their organization as "the Company"; big organizations are big organizations, public or private, and their managers indubitably have
much in common. Harrison Salisbury's recent volume about The New
York Times tells of many whistleblowers in several CIA cases and in
the legal case of "the Pentagon papers." 5 The reader is struck by the
extraordinary degree of secrecy practiced, not to protect knowledge in
the name of the republic's security but, instead, to protect the inanities and stupidities of CIA figures or of related actors.
John S.R. Shad, chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission in the administration appointed by President Reagan, declared in
an interview with Jeff Garth of The New York Times on August 3,
1981, "that a positive corporate image is essential for the successful
marketing of corporate securities, "6 an image, he says, that is "hurt by
disclosing too much unfavorable information." ' 7 Mr. Shad places less
emphasis "on his agency's legislative mandate as an independent regulatory agency intended to protect investors and more on helping the
Reagan administration's economic policies and promoting the securities industry." 8
Mr. Shad was not asked about the rights of whistleblowers whose
revelations blot corporate logos, but one may safely conclude that he
would deplore efforts to limit managers from striking blows for corporate privacy. It is his aim in office, he said, "to facilitate the accumulation of capital by public corporations by removing regulations." 9
Among the apparent facilitating ways and means to accomplish this
would be to "roll back a requirement that corporations disclose finan3

H. SALISBURY, supra note 2.
6 N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1981, at D-1.
7 Id.

8 Id. at D-8.
9Id.
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cial information about their relationships with outside accountants
who often come from firms that afford lucrative consulting services to
the clients whose books they audit."' 0 Mr. Shad also wants "to limit
negative information that corporations disclose in the annual report,
the 10-K form, that they file with the SEC."" Some attorneys, he
averred, "overcomply" with SEC regulations; "what is needed is more
'balanced disclosure.' 12 Companies thus ought not list litigation
pending against them but they should report, as the Metro-GoldwinMayer Film Company, a former client of Mr. Shad's, did not, "that its
film inventory was sharply undervalued."'13 One cannot help but
wonder whether the Pittsburgh Plate and Glass Co. (PPG) was advised by consultants from their outside auditor's firm to delay for a
decade informing auto body repairshop employees, by appropriate
labels, about the highly toxic effects of additives in their paints. The
story, recounted in several news reports at the time of this writing,
about a recent out-of-court settlement between PPG and an injured
auto painter, indicates that PPG's scientific personnel urged that labels contain warnings about the need for respiratory masks, but that
these humane employees lost out, for nearly ten years, to marketing
executives in their company who feared that such a warning would
have adverse effects on sales.
The point is clearly not that we have not been well served by
Westin's whistleblowing respondents. Nor is it at all the point that
Westin's arguments for organizational and legal reforms which might
protect those who have reason to question their employers' ways are
not compelling. Rather, the point is that we are heading into a period
in which the relevant initiatives of many corporate leaders and their
friends in Washington are moving us in the direction of less not
greater disclosure.
We may someday follow the excellent counsel Westin affords us
in his own closing chapter. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed,
after all, not quite 20 years after the efforts of Westin and his compatriots in Florida in the 1940's. We can only hope that we will overcome present-day employer resistance against employees who seek to
persuade their employers to change their course of action before they
blow whistles on them in public. And we may hope that we can do so,
as Westin suggests, without denying corporations their essential
rights.
10Id.
"I Id.
12
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The short run prospects for Westin's proposals for a workers'
version of due process are, most assuredly, dim. Such prospects, however, did not stop Westin from mobilizing his formidable legal and
social science skills in his earlier rounds with dark forces. Onward!
Excelsiorl
Ivar Berg*
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